時間速度

看過新春秋內的《當卡夫卡遇上正音正字》。如常﹐舒爾賽的文章總是太長﹐有些段落又總是隨心所欲的離題萬丈(可能整篇也離題﹐得一兩句有關)。可能是剛剛下病塌精神好(小眼疾﹐無大恙)﹐又可能是近來的文章好﹐舒兄這篇居然也看了約七﹑八成。其中提到Lestsariel踩Russell, Kant, 捧Foucault, Nietzsche一段﹐「事實上他們所持的理據很簡單︰任何知識都必須通過符號去被表達，包括數學知識。而一牽涉到符號，它的意義就不可能是客觀的，絕對的，而會涉及到文化的因素。以數學來說，它的「客觀」知識是透過主觀的、受時代限制的數字或者符號去表達的，而符號的使用準則乃是主觀的。於是1+1=2這簡單的數學知識只有在理解這種名為阿拉伯數字的意符的人眼中才有對錯值，對於非洲某原始部落的人來說，它根本就構成不了甚麼知識。另一方面，這些和我們思想不同的人又會以另一種思考模式去解釋世界，即便是在數學知識上也可能如此。」另外﹐自己也看過他這兩句:「一切都是權力建構的，一切也可以是對的，也可以是錯的。只有危險的，壟斷性的論述。」﹐「可以說，甚至歷史知識也是建構物，世上沒有任何知識是對的，沒有一個論述可以被稱為「對」。」。

我認為這幾句還有商榷的餘地。單從字面﹐其實是無可挑戰這幾句說話的﹐他要帶出的是"知識沒有絕對"這點﹐既然世間也沒有對錯﹐我們每天也在忙什麼? 任意隨心所欲就成﹐何苦規限著自己的生活規律和空間? (可能了解了這點的Nietzsche﹐最後也就這樣瘋了)。 其實要引用‘Power/ knowledge’ 一文﹐倒不如看看Foucault 的‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’(*1) 留意到"he is only interested in analysing statements in their historical context"一句﹐在不同時代背景﹐其實也存在有當時的絕對性﹐就算是Foucault自己﹐也會因以當時歷史的背景而分析當時的立論﹐再看尾句"one can describe specific systems that determine which types of statements emerge"。絕對性的對錯不是每個時代的人所關注的﹐我們活在相對性的對錯中﹐但對每一個時代的人來說﹐那個相對性的對錯就是當時的絕對性對錯。對與錯﹐本身就是相對性下產生的一種概念﹐站於不同角度去看也會產生誤差。我會用物理上的速度和相對速度去理解﹐速度大家也知是什麼﹐如果你正在踩著單車﹐離遠見到我在列子彈列車中踱步﹐和月台上的劉翔賽跑﹐驟看我仍會不知快出了多少﹔如果你的車行駛得和跑步者一樣快﹐可能你便會見到跑步者在靜止的狀態中﹐皆因我﹑他﹑甚至觀察者也在不同的時間框timeframe中。但是由於我們也同樣存在在地球上﹐速度到最後還是可計算和比較的。(不討論時空物理學﹑超越光速後的情況。) 在不同的時代背景﹐也自有不同的衡量﹑量度準則﹐我記得不久前就看過電視﹐說清初有洋人收到玉石字畫﹐就以為是垃圾﹐可能有不少墨寶就給人拿來點煙﹐洋人又怎會估到﹐一張紙﹐幾隻字﹐價格就可勝於黃金呢? 事情也同樣﹐需要有相對性的情況下才能定對錯﹐如果兩個人說的也"對"﹐卻爭持不下﹐就是論事的平台不同﹐雙方可能在基本架構上已有了出入。另外還有個情況﹐記得曾和友人為了一個英文字的讀音吵了很久﹐差不多一小時後大家也面紅耳赤﹐最後也靠字典做個公正﹐結果是: 兩個音也對﹐世間這麼大﹐很多時最難容下的卻是兩個"對"。(這卻不能套於現今的所謂‘正字’﹐因為他們的行為影響語言的首要工效 - 傳遞訊息。講別人不慣用的音韻﹐同去希臘說俄語有什麼分別?) 用沒絕對性的事實就杜絕言論﹐又實在方便得有點懶惰﹐倒不如一開始就不要說﹐(要發言不是因為開始想有自己的堅持和偏執嗎?) 因為說了話又話唔肯定豈不是等同沒說? 如果我在這裡加句:"我所說的都可能是對﹐也可能是錯的。"﹐雖然反映了現實的情況﹐但是我想﹐這句說話和說「聖誕老人可能並不存在」一樣﹐沒什麼實在的意思。我畢竟也是認為自己這刻的理解在今天相對地是有一定正確度﹐對多於錯﹐才寫給人看罷? 如果要寫篇在這刻相對性下也沒對也沒錯的文章﹐倒不如就加多篇LSD後的迷幻﹐就真係對錯也沒關係(橫豎也無人看﹐無人竹墮何曾響﹐盜鈴掩耳未為偷。嘻﹐抱歉﹐舒兄﹐又拿你那篇浩瀚萬言的文章來開玩笑)。

*1:抄錄簡括: Foucault directs his analysis toward the "statement", the basic unit of discourse that he believes has been ignored up to this point. "Statement" is the English translation from French énoncé (that which is enunciated or expressed), which has a peculiar meaning for Foucault. "Énoncé" for Foucault means that which makes propositions, utterances, or speech acts meaningful. In this understanding, statements themselves are not propositions, utterances, or speech acts. Rather, statements create a network of rules establishing what is meaningful, and it is these rules that are the preconditions for propositions, utterances, or speech acts to have meaning. Statements are also 'events'. Depending on whether or not they comply with the rules of meaning, a grammatically correct sentence may still lack meaning and inversely, an incorrect sentence may still be meaningful. Statements depend on the conditions in which they emerge and exist within a field of discourse. It is huge collections of statements, called discursive formations, toward which Foucault aims his analysis. It is important to note that Foucault reiterates that the analysis he is outlining is only one possible tactic, and that he is not seeking to displace other ways of analysing discourse or render them as invalid.

According to Dreyfus & Rabinow, Foucault not only brackets out issues of truth (cf. Husserl) he also brackets out issues of meaning. Rather than looking for a deeper meaning underneath discourse or looking for the source of meaning in some transcendental subject, Foucault analyzes the discursive and practical conditions of the existence for truth and meaning. In order to show the principles of meaning and truth production in various discursive formations he details how truth claims emerge during various epochs on the basis of what was actually said and written during these periods of time. He particularly describes the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, and the 20th Century. He strives to avoid all interpretation and to depart from the goals of hermeneutics. This does not mean that Foucault denounces truth and meaning, but just that truth and meaning depend on the historical discursive and practical means of truth and meaning production. For instance, although they were radically different during Enlightenment as opposed to Modernity, there were indeed meaning, truth and correct treatment of madness during both epochs (Madness and Civilization). This posture allows Foucault to move away from an anthropological standpoint, denouncing a priori concepts of the nature of the human subject, and focus on the role of discursive practices in constituting subjectivity.

Dispensing with finding a deeper meaning behind discourse would appear to lead Foucault toward structuralism. However, whereas structuralists search for homogeneity in a discursive entity, Foucault focuses on differences. Instead of asking what constitutes the specificity of European thought he asks what differences develop within it over time. Therefore, he refuses to examine statements outside of their role in the discursive formation, and he never examines possible statements that could have emerged from such a formation. His identity as a historian emerges here, as he is only interested in analysing statements in their historical context. The whole of the system and its discursive rules determine the identity of the statement. But, a discursive formation continually generates new statements, and some of these usher in changes in the discursive formation that may or may not be realized. Therefore, to describe a discursive formation, Foucault also focuses on expelled and forgotten discourses that never happen to change the discursive formation. Their difference to the dominant discourse also describe it. In this way one can describe specific systems that determine which types of statements emerge.